CycLedger: A Scalable and Secure Parallel Protocol for Distributed Ledger via Sharding

TL;DR

CycLedger introduces a scalable, secure sharding protocol for distributed ledgers that reduces communication overhead, enhances security against malicious leaders, and incentivizes honest participation through reputation-based rewards.

Contribution

The paper presents CycLedger, a novel sharding protocol with a semi-commitment scheme, recovery procedures, and reputation incentives to improve scalability, security, and participant motivation.

Findings

Reduces communication and storage overhead in distributed ledgers.

Provides security against malicious committee leaders.

Incentivizes honest participation through reputation rewards.

Abstract

Traditional public distributed ledgers have not been able to scale-out well and work efficiently. Sharding is deemed as a promising way to solve this problem. By partitioning all nodes into small committees and letting them work in parallel, we can significantly lower the amount of communication and computation, reduce the overhead on each node's storage, as well as enhance the throughput of the distributed ledger. Existing sharding-based protocols still suffer from several serious drawbacks. The first thing is that all non-faulty nodes must connect well with each other, which demands a huge number of communication channels in the network. Moreover, previous protocols have faced great loss in efficiency in the case where the honesty of each committee's leader is in question. At the same time, no explicit incentive is provided for nodes to actively participate in the protocol. We present CycLedger, a scalable and secure parallel protocol for distributed ledger via sharding. Our protocol selects a leader and a partial set for each committee, who are in charge of maintaining intra-shard consensus and communicating with other committees, to reduce the amortized complexity of communication, computation, and storage on all nodes. We introduce a novel semi-commitment scheme between committees and a recovery procedure to prevent the system from crashing even when leaders of committees are malicious. To add incentive for the network, we use the concept of reputation, which measures each node's trusty computing power. As nodes with a higher reputation receive more rewards, there is an encouragement for nodes with strong computing ability to work honestly to gain reputation. In this way, we strike out a new path to establish scalability, security, and incentive for the sharding-based distributed ledger.