Judicial Favoritism of Politicians: Evidence from Small Claims Court

TL;DR

This study investigates whether judges treat politician litigants differently in small claims court, finding a bias against politicians that acts as a warning sign and barrier to judicial independence.

Contribution

It introduces a theory of power collusion and provides empirical evidence of judicial bias against politicians in Brazil's small claims courts.

Findings

Judges show a 3.7 percentage point bias against politician litigants.

Bias acts as a warning to politicians, discouraging checks and balances.

Results suggest a barrier to judicial independence in development settings.

Abstract

Multiple studies have documented racial, gender, political ideology, or ethnical biases in comparative judicial systems. Supplementing this literature, we investigate whether judges rule cases differently when one of the litigants is a politician. We suggest a theory of power collusion, according to which judges might use rulings to buy cooperation or threaten members of the other branches of government. We test this theory using a sample of small claims cases in the state of S\~ao Paulo, Brazil, where no collusion should exist. The results show a negative bias of 3.7 percentage points against litigant politicians, indicating that judges punish, rather than favor, politicians in court. This punishment in low-salience cases serves as a warning sign for politicians not to cross the judiciary when exercising checks and balances, suggesting yet another barrier to judicial independence in development settings.