The dynamics of opinion expression

TL;DR

This paper introduces a model of public opinion expression that considers how individuals' willingness to express opinions is influenced by perceived majority or minority status, revealing conditions for minority dominance in discourse.

Contribution

It develops a multi-group opinion model incorporating willingness to express opinions and analyzes its dynamics using Nash equilibria and bifurcation analysis, highlighting social-structural influences.

Findings

Minority groups can dominate public discourse under certain conditions.

The model identifies social-structural factors affecting opinion dominance.

Bifurcation analysis reveals parameter regimes leading to different opinion equilibria.

Abstract

Modelling efforts in opinion dynamics have to a large extent ignored that opinion exchange between individuals can also have an effect on how willing they are to express their opinion publicly. Here, we introduce a model of public opinion expression. Two groups of agents with different opinion on an issue interact with each other, changing the willingness to express their opinion according to whether they perceive themselves as part of the majority or minority opinion. We formulate the model as a multi-group majority game and investigate the Nash equilibria. We also provide a dynamical systems perspective: Using the reinforcement learning algorithm of $Q$-learning, we reduce the $N$-agent system in a mean-field approach to two dimensions which represent the two opinion groups. This two-dimensional system is analyzed in a comprehensive bifurcation analysis of its parameters. The model identifies social-structural conditions for public opinion predominance of different groups. Among other findings, we show under which circumstances a minority can dominate public discourse.