Bringing Belief Base Change into Dynamic Epistemic Logic

TL;DR

This paper explores how to represent and reason about iterated belief base change within dynamic epistemic logic by modifying the semantics of Dynamic Preference Logic, linking belief revision postulates to logical models.

Contribution

It introduces semantic changes to Dynamic Preference Logic to enable syntactic representation of iterated belief base change, bridging belief revision theory and dynamic epistemic logic.

Findings

Semantic modifications allow representation of belief revision postulates.

Belief base change can be characterized within the logic.

Enhanced logic models iterated belief updates effectively.

Abstract

AGM's belief revision is one of the main paradigms in the study of belief change operations. In this context, belief bases (prioritised bases) have been primarily used to specify the agent's belief state. While the connection of iterated AGM-like operations and their encoding in dynamic epistemic logics have been studied before, few works considered how well-known postulates from iterated belief revision theory can be characterised by means of belief bases and their counterpart in dynamic epistemic logic. Particularly, it has been shown that some postulates can be characterised through transformations in priority graphs, while others may not be represented that way. This work investigates changes in the semantics of Dynamic Preference Logic that give rise to an appropriate syntactic representation for its models that allow us to represent and reason about iterated belief base change in this logic.