Competition between service providers with strategic resource allocation: application to network slicing

TL;DR

This paper models strategic resource allocation among 5G network operators using network slicing, deriving equilibrium solutions and analyzing their accuracy in homogeneous and heterogeneous cell scenarios.

Contribution

It introduces a strategic game model for resource sharing in network slicing and characterizes the Nash equilibrium under different cell capacity conditions.

Findings

Exact equilibrium in homogeneous cells

Approximate equilibrium in heterogeneous cells

High accuracy of the proposed solution

Abstract

We propose and analyze a business model for 5G operators. Each operator is entitled to a share of a network operated by an Infrastructure Provider (InP) and use network slicing mechanisms to request network resources as needed for service provision. The network operators become Network Slice Tenants (NSTs). The InP performs the resource allocation based on a vector of weights chosen strategically by each NST. The weights distribute the NST's share of resources between its subscribers in each cell. We propose a strategy profile in which the NST chooses weights equal to the product of its share by the ratio between the total number of subscribers in the cell and the total number of subscribers in the network. We characterize the proposed solution in terms of subscription ratios and fractions of subscribers, for different cell capacities and user sensitivities. The proposed solution provides the exact values for the Nash equilibrium if the cells are homogeneous in terms of normalized capacity, which is a measure of the total amount of resources available in the cell. Otherwise, if the cells are heterogeneous, it provides an accurate approximation. We quantify the deviation from the equilibrium and conclude that it is highly accurate.