Camouflage: Hardware-assisted CFI for the ARM Linux kernel
R\'emi Denis-Courmont, Hans Liljestrand, Carlos Chinea, Jan-Erik, Ekberg

TL;DR
This paper introduces a hardware-assisted control flow integrity solution for the ARM Linux kernel using ARMv8.3 pointer authentication, achieving precise security with minimal performance impact.
Contribution
It presents a novel design leveraging ARMv8.3 PAuth for kernel CFI, demonstrating strong security guarantees on off-the-shelf processors.
Findings
Achieves precise kernel CFI with minimal performance overhead
Utilizes ARMv8.3 PAuth extension for security
Shows deployment differences between kernel and user space
Abstract
Software control flow integrity (CFI) solutions have been applied to the Linux kernel for memory protection. Due to performance costs, deployed software CFI solutions are coarse grained. In this work, we demonstrate a precise hardware-assisted kernel CFI running on widely-used off-the-shelf processors. Specifically, we use the ARMv8.3 pointer authentication (PAuth) extension and present a design that uses it to achieve strong security guarantees with minimal performance penalties. Furthermore, we show how deployment of such security primitives in the kernel can significantly differ from their user space application.
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