Optimal Policies Tend to Seek Power
Alexander Matt Turner, Logan Smith, Rohin Shah, Andrew Critch, Prasad, Tadepalli

TL;DR
This paper develops a formal theory showing that in certain environments, optimal reinforcement learning policies tend to seek power, especially when environmental symmetries favor maintaining options and potential outcomes.
Contribution
It introduces the first formal framework analyzing the statistical tendencies of optimal policies to seek power in Markov decision processes.
Findings
Optimal policies tend to seek power in environments with certain symmetries.
Most reward functions incentivize maintaining options and larger sets of terminal states.
Power-seeking behavior emerges as optimal in environments where agents can be shut down or destroyed.
Abstract
Some researchers speculate that intelligent reinforcement learning (RL) agents would be incentivized to seek resources and power in pursuit of their objectives. Other researchers point out that RL agents need not have human-like power-seeking instincts. To clarify this discussion, we develop the first formal theory of the statistical tendencies of optimal policies. In the context of Markov decision processes, we prove that certain environmental symmetries are sufficient for optimal policies to tend to seek power over the environment. These symmetries exist in many environments in which the agent can be shut down or destroyed. We prove that in these environments, most reward functions make it optimal to seek power by keeping a range of options available and, when maximizing average reward, by navigating towards larger sets of potential terminal states.
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Taxonomy
TopicsReinforcement Learning in Robotics · Game Theory and Applications
