Policies for constraining the behaviour of coalitions of agents in the context of algebraic information theory

TL;DR

This paper explores how algebraic information theory can be used to develop policies that guide agents' actions in games, unifying geometric, topological, and algebraic approaches into a cohesive framework.

Contribution

It introduces a novel approach to agent policy formulation within game theory using algebraic information theory, integrating multiple mathematical perspectives.

Findings

Unified framework for geometric, topological, and algebraic information theories.

Method for agents to select actions that constrain subsidiary agents.

Potential applications in strategic decision-making and multi-agent systems.

Abstract

This article takes an oblique sidestep from two previous papers, wherein an approach to reformulation of game theory in terms of information theory, topology, as well as a few other notions was indicated. In this document a description is provided as to how one might determine an approach for an agent to choose a policy concerning which actions to take in a game that constrains behaviour of subsidiary agents. It is then demonstrated how these results in algebraic information theory, together with previous investigations in geometric and topological information theory, can be unified into a single cohesive framework.