On the Legal Compatibility of Fairness Definitions
Alice Xiang, Inioluwa Deborah Raji

TL;DR
This paper examines the misalignment between machine learning fairness definitions and U.S. anti-discrimination law, highlighting legal misunderstandings and suggesting lessons for both communities.
Contribution
It reveals how ML fairness definitions often misinterpret legal concepts, emphasizing the need for better alignment with legal standards in fairness research.
Findings
Examples of legal and ML terminology misalignment
Discussion on legal and ML fairness community lessons
Analysis focused on U.S. anti-discrimination law
Abstract
Past literature has been effective in demonstrating ideological gaps in machine learning (ML) fairness definitions when considering their use in complex socio-technical systems. However, we go further to demonstrate that these definitions often misunderstand the legal concepts from which they purport to be inspired, and consequently inappropriately co-opt legal language. In this paper, we demonstrate examples of this misalignment and discuss the differences in ML terminology and their legal counterparts, as well as what both the legal and ML fairness communities can learn from these tensions. We focus this paper on U.S. anti-discrimination law since the ML fairness research community regularly references terms from this body of law.
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsEthics and Social Impacts of AI · Free Will and Agency · Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations
