Critical mass effect in evolutionary games triggered by zealots

TL;DR

This paper investigates how a small committed minority, or zealots, can induce large-scale coordination in systems modeled by evolutionary games, highlighting the existence of a tipping point influenced by game type, network structure, and update rules.

Contribution

It demonstrates the conditions under which zealots can trigger widespread coordination, revealing the role of critical mass in evolutionary game dynamics.

Findings

A finite fraction of zealots can induce large-scale coordination in certain games.

The tipping point depends on game type, network structure, and update rules.

Coordination is more easily achieved in some game settings than others.

Abstract

Tiny perturbations may trigger large responses in systems near criticality, shifting them across equilibria. Committed minorities are suggested to be responsible for the emergence of collective behaviors in many physical, social, and biological systems. Using evolutionary game theory, we address the question whether a finite fraction of zealots can drive the system to large-scale coordination. We find that a tipping point exists in coordination games, whereas the same phenomenon depends on the selection pressure, update rule, and network structure in other types of games. Our study paves the way to understand social systems driven by the individuals' benefit in presence of zealots, such as human vaccination behavior or cooperative transports in animal groups.