RS-Mask: Random Space Masking as an Integrated Countermeasure against Power and Fault Analysis
Keyvan Ramezanpour, Paul Ampadu, William Diehl

TL;DR
RS-Mask is a novel countermeasure that provides simultaneous protection against power analysis and fault analysis attacks by ensuring uniform distribution of sensitive variables, demonstrated on AES with increased hardware overhead.
Contribution
This paper introduces RS-Mask, a new masking scheme that defends against both power and fault analysis, including advanced fault techniques, with practical FPGA implementation.
Findings
RS-Mask effectively prevents SIFA attacks on AES.
RS-Mask resists power analysis using Welch's t-test.
Infective RS-Mask defends against differential fault techniques.
Abstract
While modern masking schemes provide provable security against passive side-channel analysis (SCA), such as power analysis, single faults can be employed to recover the secret key of ciphers even in masked implementations. In this paper, we propose random space masking (RS-Mask) as a countermeasure against both power analysis and statistical fault analysis (SFA) techniques. In the RS-Mask scheme, the distribution of all sensitive variables, faulty and/or correct values is uniform, and it therefore protects the implementations against any SFA technique that exploits the distribution of intermediate variables, including fault sensitivity analysis (FSA), statistical ineffective fault analysis (SIFA) and fault intensity map analysis (FIMA). We implement RS-Mask on AES, and show that a SIFA attack is not able to identify the correct key. We additionally show that an FPGA implementation of…
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