UWB-ED: Distance Enlargement Attack Detection in Ultra-Wideband

TL;DR

This paper introduces UWB-ED, a novel modulation technique designed to detect distance enlargement attacks in ultra-wideband systems, enhancing secure distance verification for autonomous and cyber-physical systems.

Contribution

The paper proposes UWB-ED, a new modulation method that detects adversarial distance enlargement attacks without relying on cryptography or upper-layer security protocols.

Findings

UWB-ED effectively detects distance enlargement attacks.

UWB-ED is compatible with 802.15.4z Low Rate Pulse and 5G standards.

The technique enhances secure distance measurement in adversarial environments.

Abstract

Mobile autonomous systems, robots, and cyber-physical systems rely on accurate positioning information. To conduct distance-measurement, two devices exchange signals and, knowing these signals propagate at the speed of light, the time of arrival is used for distance estimations. Existing distance-measurement techniques are incapable of protecting against adversarial distance enlargement---a highly devastating tactic in which the adversary reissues a delayed version of the signals transmitted between devices, after distorting the authentic signal to prevent the receiver from identifying it. The adversary need not break crypto, nor compromise any upper-layer security protocols for mounting this attack. No known solution currently exists to protect against distance enlargement. We present \textit{Ultra-Wideband Enlargement Detection} (UWB-ED), a new modulation technique to detect distance enlargement attacks, and securely verify distances between two mutually trusted devices. We analyze UWB-ED under an adversary that injects signals to block/modify authentic signals. We show how UWB-ED is a good candidate for 802.15.4z Low Rate Pulse and the 5G standard.