Does set theory really ground arithmetic truth?
Alfredo Roque Freire

TL;DR
This paper critically examines the foundational role of set theory in grounding arithmetic truth, arguing that standard models are inherently revisable and that interpretability is probabilistically negligible.
Contribution
It challenges the assumption that set theory provides a stable foundation for arithmetic by emphasizing the revisability of models and analyzing interpretability probabilities.
Findings
Standard models are revisable and not fixed.
Interpreted arithmetic models often have more theorems than original.
Probability of a random extension of arithmetic being interpretable in set theory is zero.
Abstract
We consider the foundational relation between arithmetic and set theory. Our goal is to criticize the construction of standard arithmetic models as providing grounds for arithmetic truth (even in a relative sense). Our method is to emphasize the incomplete picture of both theories and treat models as their syntactical counterparts. Insisting on the incomplete picture will allow us to argue in favor of the revisability of the standard model interpretation. We then show that it is hopeless to expect that the relative grounding provided by a standard interpretation can resist being revisable. We start briefly characterizing the expansion of arithmetic truth provided by the interpretation in a set theory. Further, we show that, for every well-founded interpretation of recursive extensions of PA in extensions of ZF, the interpreted version of arithmetic has more theorems than the original.…
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Taxonomy
TopicsPhilosophy and History of Science · Computability, Logic, AI Algorithms · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
