Active Re-identification Attacks on Periodically Released Dynamic Social Graphs
Xihui Chen, Ema K\"epuska, Sjouke Mauw, Yunior Ram\'irez-Cruz

TL;DR
This paper introduces a novel active re-identification attack on periodically published dynamic social graphs, significantly improving success rates and efficiency over static attacks, and explores factors affecting attack effectiveness to inform better anonymization methods.
Contribution
It presents the first active attack tailored for periodically published dynamic social graphs, leveraging tempo-structural patterns to enhance re-identification success and efficiency.
Findings
Attack increases re-identification success probability by over two times.
Efficiency improves by almost 10 times compared to static attacks.
Attack remains effective over multiple publication cycles.
Abstract
Active re-identification attacks pose a serious threat to privacy-preserving social graph publication. Active attackers create fake accounts to build structural patterns in social graphs which can be used to re-identify legitimate users on published anonymised graphs, even without additional background knowledge. So far, this type of attacks has only been studied in the scenario where the inherently dynamic social graph is published once. In this paper, we present the first active re-identification attack in the more realistic scenario where a dynamic social graph is periodically published. The new attack leverages tempo-structural patterns for strengthening the adversary. Through a comprehensive set of experiments on real-life and synthetic dynamic social graphs, we show that our new attack substantially outperforms the most effective static active attack in the literature by…
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