How to profit from payments channels
Oguzhan Ersoy, Stefanie Roos, Zekeriya Erkin

TL;DR
This paper explores how payment nodes in blockchain networks can optimize their channel fees and connections to maximize profits, using a formal NP-hard problem and a greedy approximation algorithm validated by real-world data.
Contribution
It formalizes the profit maximization problem for nodes in payment channel networks and proposes a greedy algorithm to approximate optimal fee and channel strategies.
Findings
The optimization problem is NP-hard.
The greedy algorithm achieves at least twice the profit of other strategies.
Simulation with real data confirms the effectiveness of the proposed approach.
Abstract
Payment channel networks like Bitcoin's Lightning network are an auspicious approach for realizing high transaction throughput and almost-instant confirmations in blockchain networks. However, the ability to successfully make payments in such networks relies on the willingness of participants to lock collateral in the network. In Lightning, the key financial incentive is to lock collateral are small fees for routing payments for other participants. While users can choose these fees, currently, they mainly stick to the default fees. By providing insights on beneficial choices for fees, we aim to incentivize users to lock more collateral and improve the effectiveness of the network. In this paper, we consider a node that given the network topology and the channel details selects where to establish channels and how much fee to charge such that its financial gain is…
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