The impact of quantum computing on real-world security: A 5G case study
Chris J Mitchell

TL;DR
This paper analyzes how quantum computing could threaten 5G security and proposes a phased, backward-compatible strategy to upgrade cryptography, ensuring secure communication as quantum technology advances.
Contribution
It introduces a novel multi-phase, backward-compatible approach for upgrading 5G security to withstand quantum computing threats.
Findings
Quantum computing poses significant risks to current 5G cryptography.
A phased migration plan can facilitate a smooth transition to post-quantum security.
Backward compatibility is key to practical security upgrades.
Abstract
This paper provides a detailed analysis of the impact of quantum computing on the security of 5G mobile telecommunications. This involves considering how cryptography is used in 5G, and how the security of the system would be affected by the advent of quantum computing. This leads naturally to the specification of a series of simple, phased, recommended changes intended to ensure that the security of 5G (as well as 3G and 4G) is not badly damaged if and when large scale quantum computing becomes a practical reality. By exploiting backwards-compatibility features of the 5G security system design, we are able to propose a novel multi-phase approach to upgrading security that allows for a simple and smooth migration to a post-quantum-secure system.
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