Breaking the Hidden Irreducible Polynomials Scheme
Christian Eder

TL;DR
This paper reveals a critical flaw in a 2019 cryptography scheme based on hidden irreducible polynomials, enabling private key recovery from the public key and compromising security.
Contribution
The paper identifies and demonstrates a fundamental vulnerability in Gomez's 2019 scheme, exposing its insecurity due to a recoverable private key.
Findings
The scheme's design allows private key extraction from the public key.
The flaw compromises the scheme's security assumptions.
The attack method is straightforward and effective.
Abstract
In 2019 G\'omez described a new public key cryptography scheme based on ideas from multivariate public key cryptography using hidden irreducible polynomials. We show that the scheme's design has a flaw which lets an attacker recover the private key directly from the public key.
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Taxonomy
TopicsPolynomial and algebraic computation · Coding theory and cryptography · Cryptography and Residue Arithmetic
