Bell inequalities, Counterfactual Definiteness and Falsifiability

TL;DR

This paper clarifies a fundamental inconsistency in the interpretation of Bell inequalities, proposing a natural assumption that aligns the theorem more closely with experimental practice and removes philosophical ambiguities.

Contribution

It introduces a justified assumption that resolves the incongruence in Bell inequality interpretations, bridging the gap between philosophical debate and experimental verification.

Findings

Identifies an enduring incongruence in Bell inequality interpretations

Proposes a natural assumption to resolve the incongruence

Reframes Bell theorem as directly relevant to experimental physics

Abstract

We formally prove the existence of an enduring incongruence pervading a widespread interpretation of the Bell inequality and explain how to rationally avoid it with a natural assumption justified by explicit reference to a mathematical property of Bell's probabilistic model. Although the amendment does not alter the relevance of the theorem regarding local realism, it brings back Bell theorem from the realm of philosophical discussions about counterfactual conditionals to the concrete experimental arena.