Disclosure Games with Large Evidence Spaces
Shaofei Jiang

TL;DR
This paper analyzes a disclosure game with large evidence spaces, characterizing equilibrium strategies where the sender selectively discloses evidence to persuade the receiver about the state, including a general framework for such games.
Contribution
It introduces a comprehensive framework for disclosure games with large evidence spaces and characterizes the unique equilibrium value function.
Findings
Seemingly sub-optimal disclosures can be equilibrium strategies.
Disclosures maximize the difference between good and bad signals.
A method to construct equilibria in broad classes of disclosure games.
Abstract
We study a disclosure game with a large evidence space. There is an unknown binary state. A sender observes a sequence of binary signals about the state and discloses a left truncation of the sequence to a receiver in order to convince him that the state is good. We focus on truth-leaning equilibria (cf. Hart et al. (2017)), where the sender discloses truthfully when doing so is optimal, and the receiver takes off-path disclosure at face value. In equilibrium, seemingly sub-optimal truncations are disclosed, and the disclosure contains the longest truncation that yields the maximal difference between the number of good and bad signals. We also study a general framework of disclosure games which is compatible with large evidence spaces, a wide range of disclosure technologies, and finitely many states. We characterize the unique equilibrium value function of the sender and propose a…
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Taxonomy
TopicsAuction Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems
