Efficient Regret Minimization Algorithm for Extensive-Form Correlated Equilibrium
Gabriele Farina, Chun Kai Ling, Fei Fang, Tuomas Sandholm

TL;DR
This paper introduces an efficient regret minimization algorithm for computing extensive-form correlated equilibria in large two-player general-sum games without chance moves, overcoming structural challenges of the correlation plan space.
Contribution
The paper presents the first scalable regret minimization algorithm for extensive-form correlated equilibria in general-sum games, using a novel convexity-preserving operation called scaled extension.
Findings
Algorithm significantly outperforms prior methods.
It is the only viable approach for larger problems.
Produces feasible iterates consistently.
Abstract
Self-play methods based on regret minimization have become the state of the art for computing Nash equilibria in large two-players zero-sum extensive-form games. These methods fundamentally rely on the hierarchical structure of the players' sequential strategy spaces to construct a regret minimizer that recursively minimizes regret at each decision point in the game tree. In this paper, we introduce the first efficient regret minimization algorithm for computing extensive-form correlated equilibria in large two-player general-sum games with no chance moves. Designing such an algorithm is significantly more challenging than designing one for the Nash equilibrium counterpart, as the constraints that define the space of correlation plans lack the hierarchical structure and might even form cycles. We show that some of the constraints are redundant and can be excluded from consideration, and…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Applications · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
