Intercept-Resend Emulation Attacks Against a Continuous-Variable Quantum Authentication Protocol with Physical Unclonable Keys

TL;DR

This paper evaluates the security of a continuous-variable quantum authentication protocol using physical unclonable keys against intercept-resend attacks, analyzing its robustness across various parameters and comparing it to existing security bounds.

Contribution

It provides the first detailed analysis of intercept-resend emulation attacks on a continuous-variable quantum authentication protocol with physical unclonable keys.

Findings

Protocol shows robustness against certain attack parameters.

Performance varies with physical parameters of the system.

Comparison indicates the protocol's security bounds are consistent with theoretical predictions.

Abstract

Optical physical unclonable keys are currently considered to be rather promising candidates for the development of entity authentication protocols, which offer security against both classical and quantum adversaries. In this work we investigate the robustness of a continuous-variable protocol, which relies on the scattering of coherent states of light from the key, against three different types of intercept-resend emulation attacks. The performance of the protocol is analysed for a broad range of physical parameters, and our results are compared to existing security bounds.