Cyber-Security Internals of a Skoda Octavia vRS: A Hands on Approach
Colin Urquhart, Xavier Bellekens, Christos Tachtatzis, Robert, Atkinson, Hanan Hindy, Amar Seeam

TL;DR
This paper conducts a comprehensive security analysis of a 2017 Skoda Octavia vRS, demonstrating vulnerabilities in key fob security, infotainment privacy, and vehicle communication protocols, highlighting critical threats in connected vehicles.
Contribution
It provides a hands-on evaluation of in-vehicle cybersecurity, including reverse engineering protocols and demonstrating practical attack vectors on modern connected cars.
Findings
Key fob rolling code is compromised
Privacy attacks via infotainment system demonstrated
Volkswagen Transport Protocol 2.0 reverse engineered
Abstract
The convergence of information technology and vehicular technologies are a growing paradigm, allowing information to be sent by and to vehicles. This information can further be processed by the Electronic Control Unit (ECU) and the Controller Area Network (CAN) for in-vehicle communications or through a mobile phone or server for out-vehicle communication. Information sent by or to the vehicle can be life-critical (e.g. breaking, acceleration, cruise control, emergency communication, etc. . . ). As vehicular technology advances, in-vehicle networks are connected to external networks through 3 and 4G mobile networks, enabling manufacturer and customer monitoring of different aspects of the car. While these services provide valuable information, they also increase the attack surface of the vehicle, and can enable long and short range attacks. In this manuscript, we evaluate the security…
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