Blameworthiness in Security Games

TL;DR

This paper introduces a logical framework to assess blameworthiness in security games, considering the asymmetry of information, and formalizes how to reason about responsibility of defenders and attackers.

Contribution

It provides the first formal logical system for reasoning about blameworthiness in security games, incorporating information asymmetry.

Findings

Logical system for blameworthiness established

Axioms capturing information asymmetry proved sound and complete

Framework enables formal responsibility assessment in security scenarios

Abstract

Security games are an example of a successful real-world application of game theory. The paper defines blameworthiness of the defender and the attacker in security games using the principle of alternative possibilities and provides a sound and complete logical system for reasoning about blameworthiness in such games. Two of the axioms of this system capture the asymmetry of information in security games.