Intelligence in Strategic Games
Pavel Naumov, Yuan Yuan
TL;DR
This paper develops a logical framework for understanding coalition strategies in strategic games, incorporating intelligence and knowledge modalities to model imperfect information scenarios.
Contribution
It introduces a sound and complete logical system that captures the interaction between coalition power, intelligence, and distributed knowledge in such games.
Findings
Logical system accurately models coalition strategies with intelligence.
Proves soundness and completeness of the logical framework.
Enhances understanding of imperfect information in strategic settings.
Abstract
The article considers strategies of coalitions that are based on intelligence information about moves of some of the other agents. The main technical result is a sound and complete logical system that describes the interplay between coalition power modality with intelligence and distributed knowledge modality in games with imperfect information.
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Taxonomy
TopicsLogic, Reasoning, and Knowledge