Assortment and Reciprocity Mechanisms for Promotion of Cooperation in a Model of Multilevel Selection

TL;DR

This paper investigates how assortment, reciprocity, and other-regarding preferences, combined with multilevel selection, promote cooperation in Prisoners' Dilemma games, revealing their synergistic effects and limitations in achieving optimal collective payoffs.

Contribution

It extends PDE replicator models to analyze the combined effects of multiple cooperation-promoting mechanisms within multilevel selection frameworks.

Findings

All mechanisms synergistically promote cooperation with multilevel selection.

Other-regarding preferences uniquely achieve socially optimal intermediate cooperation.

Mechanisms are susceptible to lower-level selection, limiting maximal collective payoff.

Abstract

In the study of the evolution of cooperation, many mechanisms have been proposed to help overcome the self-interested cheating that is individually optimal in the Prisoners' Dilemma game. These mechanisms include assortative or networked social interactions, other-regarding preferences considering the payoffs of others, reciprocity rules to establish cooperation as a social norm, and multilevel selection involving simultaneous competition between individuals favoring cheaters and competition between groups favoring cooperators. In this paper, we build on recent work studying PDE replicator equations for multilevel selection to understand how within-group mechanisms of assortment, other-regarding preferences, and both direct and indirect reciprocity can help to facilitate cooperation in concert with evolutionary competition between groups. We consider a group-structured population in which interactions between individuals consist of Prisoners' Dilemma games, and study the dynamics of multilevel competition determined by the payoffs individuals receive when interacting according to these within-group mechanisms. We find that the presence of each of these mechanisms acts synergistically with multilevel selection for the promotion of cooperation, decreasing the strength of between-group competition required to sustain long-time cooperation and increasing the collective payoff achieved by the population. However, we find that only other-regarding preferences allows for the achievement of socially optimal collective payoffs for Prisoners' Dilemma games in which average payoff is maximized by an intermediate mix of cooperators and defectors. For the other three mechanisms, the multilevel dynamics remain susceptible to a shadow of lower-level selection, as the collective outcome fails to exceed the payoff of the all-cooperator group.