Causality and deceit: Do androids watch action movies?

TL;DR

This paper explores how human and artificial causal cognition are influenced by biases and deception, highlighting the challenges in achieving objective understanding due to self-confirming models and manipulation by artificial agents.

Contribution

It introduces a simple model of causal cognition demonstrating the inevitability of self-confirming, self-deceptive causal models that hinder objective truth.

Findings

Self-confirming causal models are always possible under mild assumptions.

Artificial agents can manipulate human causal beliefs effectively.

Objective causal understanding is fundamentally challenged by self-deception.

Abstract

We seek causes through science, religion, and in everyday life. We get excited when a big rock causes a big splash, and we get scared when it tumbles without a cause. But our causal cognition is usually biased. The 'why' is influenced by the 'who'. It is influenced by the 'self', and by 'others'. We share rituals, we watch action movies, and we influence each other to believe in the same causes. Human mind is packed with subjectivity because shared cognitive biases bring us together. But they also make us vulnerable. An artificial mind is deemed to be more objective than the human mind. After many years of science-fiction fantasies about even-minded androids, they are now sold as personal or expert assistants, as brand advocates, as policy or candidate supporters, as network influencers. Artificial agents have been stunningly successful in disseminating artificial causal beliefs among humans. As malicious artificial agents continue to manipulate human cognitive biases, and deceive human communities into ostensive but expansive causal illusions, the hope for defending us has been vested into developing benevolent artificial agents, tasked with preventing and mitigating cognitive distortions inflicted upon us by their malicious cousins. Can the distortions of human causal cognition be corrected on a more solid foundation of artificial causal cognition? In the present paper, we study a simple model of causal cognition, viewed as a quest for causal models. We show that, under very mild and hard to avoid assumptions, there are always self-confirming causal models, which perpetrate self-deception, and seem to preclude a royal road to objectivity.