HDMI-Walk: Attacking HDMI Distribution Networks via Consumer Electronic Control Protocol

TL;DR

This paper reveals vulnerabilities in HDMI's CEC protocol, demonstrating how attackers can exploit these flaws to perform remote and local attacks on HDMI devices, highlighting a new security threat in widely used multimedia systems.

Contribution

It introduces HDMI-Walk, the first framework to exploit CEC protocol vulnerabilities for attacking HDMI distribution networks, including remote control and denial of service attacks.

Findings

Demonstrated feasibility of remote and local attacks on HDMI devices

Showed that CEC vulnerabilities can lead to arbitrary device control

Proposed security measures for HDMI device networks

Abstract

The High Definition Multimedia Interface (HDMI) is the de-facto standard for Audio/Video interfacing between video-enabled devices. Today, almost tens of billions of HDMI devices exist worldwide and are widely used to distribute A/V signals in smart homes, offices, concert halls, and sporting events making HDMI one of the most highly deployed systems in the world. An important component in HDMI is the Consumer Electronics Control (CEC) protocol, which allows for the interaction between devices within an HDMI distribution network. Nonetheless, existing network security mechanisms only protect traditional networking components, leaving CEC outside of their scope. In this work, we identify and tap into CEC protocol vulnerabilities, using them to implement realistic proof-of-work attacks on HDMI distribution networks. We study, how current insecure CEC protocol practices and HDMI distributions may grant an adversary a novel attack surface for HDMI devices otherwise thought to be unreachable. To introduce this novel attack surface, we present HDMI-Walk, which opens a realm of remote and local CEC attacks to HDMI devices. Specifically, with HDMI-Walk, an attacker can perform malicious analysis of devices, eavesdropping, Denial of Service attacks, targeted device attacks, and even facilitate well-known existing attacks through HDMI. With HDMI-Walk, we prove it is feasible for an attacker to gain arbitrary control of HDMI devices. We demonstrate the implementations of both local and remote attacks with commodity HDMI devices. Finally, we discuss security mechanisms to provide impactful and comprehensive security evaluation to these real-world systems while guaranteeing deployability and providing minimal overhead considering the current limitations of the CEC protocol. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work solely investigating the security of HDMI device distribution networks.