Implementing Grover oracles for quantum key search on AES and LowMC
Samuel Jaques, Michael Naehrig, Martin Roetteler, Fernando Virdia

TL;DR
This paper develops optimized quantum circuits for Grover's algorithm targeting AES and LowMC, reducing attack costs by balancing qubit count and circuit depth, with implications for post-quantum cryptography security assessments.
Contribution
It introduces depth-reduction techniques for Grover oracles, providing the first full implementations and resource estimates for AES and LowMC quantum attacks.
Findings
Lower overall attack costs in gate count and depth-times-width models.
New security estimates for AES categories in post-quantum cryptography.
First full implementations and resource estimates of Grover oracles for AES and LowMC.
Abstract
Grover's search algorithm gives a quantum attack against block ciphers by searching for a key that matches a small number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs. This attack uses calls to the cipher to search a key space of size . Previous work in the specific case of AES derived the full gate cost by analyzing quantum circuits for the cipher, but focused on minimizing the number of qubits. In contrast, we study the cost of quantum key search attacks under a depth restriction and introduce techniques that reduce the oracle depth, even if it requires more qubits. As cases in point, we design quantum circuits for the block ciphers AES and LowMC. Our circuits give a lower overall attack cost in both the gate count and depth-times-width cost models. In NIST's post-quantum cryptography standardization process, security categories are defined based on the concrete cost of quantum key…
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