Impartial Selection with Additive Approximation Guarantees
Ioannis Caragiannis, George Christodoulou, Nicos Protopapas

TL;DR
This paper studies impartial selection in directed graphs, proposing randomized mechanisms with additive approximation guarantees of a9(\
Contribution
It introduces new randomized impartial selection mechanisms with specific additive approximation bounds and characterizes limitations of deterministic and strong sample mechanisms.
Findings
Randomized mechanisms achieve a9(\
Negative results establish lower bounds for various classes of mechanisms.
Abstract
Impartial selection has recently received much attention within the multi-agent systems community. The task is, given a directed graph representing nominations to the members of a community by other members, to select the member with the highest number of nominations. This seemingly trivial goal becomes challenging when there is an additional impartiality constraint, requiring that no single member can influence her chance of being selected. Recent progress has identified impartial selection rules with optimal approximation ratios. Moreover, it was noted that worst-case instances are graphs with few vertices. Motivated by this fact, we propose the study of additive approximation, the difference between the highest number of nominations and the number of nominations of the selected member, as an alternative measure of the quality of impartial selection. Our positive results include two…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
