Social Resource Allocation in a Mobility System with Connected and Automated Vehicles: A Mechanism Design Problem

TL;DR

This paper explores a mechanism design approach to optimize social resource allocation in connected and automated vehicle systems, aiming to prevent rebound effects and improve overall mobility efficiency through socio-economic incentives.

Contribution

It introduces a novel mechanism design framework that incorporates socio-economic incentives to manage traveler behavior and prevent rebound effects in CAV-based mobility systems.

Findings

Proposed an economic mechanism to influence traveler decisions.

Demonstrated potential to prevent increased vehicle miles traveled.

Enhanced efficiency of resource allocation in automated mobility systems.

Abstract

In this paper, we investigate the social resource allocation in an emerging mobility system consisting of connected and automated vehicles (CAVs) using mechanism design. CAVs provide the most intriguing opportunity for enabling travelers to monitor mobility system conditions efficiently and make better decisions. However, this new reality will influence travelers' tendency-of-travel and might give rise to rebound effects, e.g., increased-vehicle-miles traveled. To tackle this phenomenon, we propose a mechanism design formulation that provides an efficient social resource allocation of travel time for all travelers. Our focus is on the socio-technical aspect of the problem, i.e., by designing appropriate socio-economic incentives, we seek to prevent potential rebound effects. In particular, we propose an economically inspired mechanism to influence the impact of the travelers' decision-making on the well-being of an emerging mobility system.