Information Closure Theory of Consciousness
Acer Y.C. Chang, Martin Biehl, Yen Yu, Ryota Kanai

TL;DR
The paper introduces the Information Closure Theory of Consciousness (ICT), proposing that conscious processes are characterized by non-trivial informational closure at certain neural levels, explaining various phenomena of consciousness.
Contribution
It presents a novel informational framework for consciousness, defining conscious content and level through informational closure, and offers explanations for consciousness phenomena.
Findings
ICT explains the confinement of conscious experience due to informational closure.
Provides quantitative definitions for conscious content and level.
Reconciles existing theories and offers a unified informational perspective.
Abstract
Information processing in neural systems can be described and analysed at multiple spatiotemporal scales. Generally, information at lower levels is more fine-grained and can be coarse-grained in higher levels. However, information processed only at specific levels seems to be available for conscious awareness. We do not have direct experience of information available at the level of individual neurons, which is noisy and highly stochastic. Neither do we have experience of more macro-level interactions such as interpersonal communications. Neurophysiological evidence suggests that conscious experiences co-vary with information encoded in coarse-grained neural states such as the firing pattern of a population of neurons. In this article, we introduce a new informational theory of consciousness: Information Closure Theory of Consciousness (ICT). We hypothesise that conscious processes are…
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