Mixup Inference: Better Exploiting Mixup to Defend Adversarial Attacks
Tianyu Pang, Kun Xu, Jun Zhu

TL;DR
This paper introduces Mixup Inference (MI), a novel method that actively enhances adversarial robustness of models trained with mixup by leveraging global linearity during inference.
Contribution
The paper proposes a new inference technique, MI, that exploits the global linearity of mixup-trained models to better defend against adversarial attacks.
Findings
MI improves adversarial robustness on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100.
Mixup-trained models with MI outperform passive defense methods.
MI effectively transfers and shrinks adversarial perturbations during inference.
Abstract
It has been widely recognized that adversarial examples can be easily crafted to fool deep networks, which mainly root from the locally non-linear behavior nearby input examples. Applying mixup in training provides an effective mechanism to improve generalization performance and model robustness against adversarial perturbations, which introduces the globally linear behavior in-between training examples. However, in previous work, the mixup-trained models only passively defend adversarial attacks in inference by directly classifying the inputs, where the induced global linearity is not well exploited. Namely, since the locality of the adversarial perturbations, it would be more efficient to actively break the locality via the globality of the model predictions. Inspired by simple geometric intuition, we develop an inference principle, named mixup inference (MI), for mixup-trained…
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Taxonomy
TopicsAdversarial Robustness in Machine Learning · Advanced Malware Detection Techniques · Anomaly Detection Techniques and Applications
MethodsMixup
