Security Risk Analysis of the Shorter-Queue Routing Policy for Two Symmetric Servers
Yu Tang, Yining Wen, Li Jin

TL;DR
This paper analyzes the security risks of the shortest queue routing policy in a two-server system under malicious attacks, modeling attacker-defender strategies and comparing security risks with a Bernoulli routing benchmark.
Contribution
It formulates a game-theoretic model of attacker and defender strategies in shortest queue routing, deriving equilibrium strategies and quantifying security risks.
Findings
Attacker's optimal strategy is to attack all or none of the jobs.
Defender's strategy depends on the job arrival rate.
Security risk varies with demand relative to server capacity.
Abstract
In this article, we study the classical shortest queue problem under the influence of malicious attacks, which is relevant to a variety of engineering system including transportation, manufacturing, and communications. We consider a homogeneous Poisson arrival process of jobs and two parallel exponential servers with symmetric service rates. A system operator route incoming jobs to the shorter queue; if the queues are equal, the job is routed randomly. A malicious attacker is able to intercept the operator's routing instruction and overwrite it with a randomly generated one. The operator is able to defend individual jobs to ensure correct routing. Both attacking and defending induce technological costs. The attacker's (resp. operator's) decision is the probability of attacking (resp. defending) the routing of each job. We first quantify the queuing cost for given strategy profiles by…
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