Avoiding Fake State or Bright Light attack on the Single-Photon Detector

TL;DR

This paper discusses vulnerabilities in single-photon detectors, specifically avalanche photodiodes, exploited by eavesdroppers through bright light attacks, highlighting the need for improved security measures in quantum communication systems.

Contribution

It analyzes the Bright Light attack on single-photon detectors and emphasizes the importance of avoiding such vulnerabilities in quantum communication.

Findings

Bright Light attack can blind avalanche photodiodes

Current detectors are vulnerable to eavesdropper exploitation

Security loopholes in classical components used in quantum systems

Abstract

The eavesdropper technique nowadays is already improved from the theoretical perspective to the experimental perspective. The technique now more focusing on the loopholes of the components used such as modulator, laser, and detector. These all components actually are the classical component which normally being used in the communication system. The technique called "blinding detector" introduce by Vadim Makarov et. al. exploit the unavailability of a true single-photon detector. The detector behavior which is avalanche photodiode (APD) is being used in almost all quantum system and exploiting its vulnerability towards the quantum attacks which is limit the potential to detect the presence of the eavesdropper attack.