Discussing the Feasibility of Acoustic Sensors for Side Channel-aided Industrial Intrusion Detection: An Essay

TL;DR

This paper explores the potential of using acoustic sensors as side-channel data sources for industrial intrusion detection, emphasizing their feasibility and the insights gained from experimental data.

Contribution

It provides a conceptual discussion and initial insights into using acoustic sensors for security monitoring in industrial environments, a novel approach in this context.

Findings

Acoustic sensors can provide valuable side-channel data for intrusion detection.

Experimental data shows potential for acoustic sensors to enhance security insights.

The approach is feasible with existing sensor technology.

Abstract

The fourth industrial revolution leads to an increased use of embedded computation and intercommunication in an industrial environment. While reducing cost and effort for set up, operation and maintenance, and increasing the time to operation or market respectively as well as the efficiency, this also increases the attack surface of enterprises. Industrial enterprises have become targets of cyber criminals in the last decade, reasons being espionage but also politically motivated. Infamous attack campaigns as well as easily available malware that hits industry in an unprepared state create a large threat landscape. As industrial systems often operate for many decades and are difficult or impossible to upgrade in terms of security, legacy-compatible industrial security solutions are necessary in order to create a security parameter. One plausible approach in industry is the implementation and employment of side-channel sensors. Combining readily available sensor data from different sources via different channels can provide an enhanced insight about the security state. In this work, a data set of an experimental industrial set up containing side channel sensors is discussed conceptually and insights are derived.