Two-Way Coding and Attack Decoupling in Control Systems Under Injection Attacks

TL;DR

This paper introduces two-way coding and attack decoupling techniques to enhance the security of feedback control systems against injection attacks by nullifying attack effects.

Contribution

It applies two-way coding from communication theory to control systems and proposes a co-design method to eliminate attack influence.

Findings

Two-way coding can be integrated into control systems.

Attack decoupling effectively nullifies attack transfer functions.

The method ensures zero attack effect in transient and steady states.

Abstract

In this paper, we introduce the concept of two-way coding, which originates in communication theory characterizing coding schemes for two-way channels, into control theory, particularly to facilitate the analysis and design of feedback control systems under injection attacks. Moreover, we propose the notion of attack decoupling, and show how the controller and the two-way coding can be co-designed to nullify the transfer function from attack to plant, rendering the attack effect zero both in transient phase and in steady state.