Value Iteration Algorithm for Mean-field Games
Berkay Anahtarci, Can Deha Kariksiz, Naci Saldi

TL;DR
This paper introduces a value iteration algorithm using Q-functions to compute mean-field equilibria in discrete-time mean field games, applicable to both discounted and average cost criteria, and proves its convergence.
Contribution
It presents the first value iteration algorithm for mean-field games that guarantees convergence to equilibrium using Q-functions.
Findings
Algorithm converges to mean-field equilibrium fixed point.
Applicable to both discounted and average cost criteria.
Provides a constructive method for equilibrium computation.
Abstract
In the literature, existence of mean-field equilibria has been established for discrete-time mean field games under both the discounted cost and the average cost optimality criteria. In this paper, we provide a value iteration algorithm to compute mean-field equilibrium for both the discounted cost and the average cost criteria, whose existence proved previously. We establish that the value iteration algorithm converges to the fixed point of a mean-field equilibrium operator. Then, using this fixed point, we construct a mean-field equilibrium. In our value iteration algorithm, we use -functions instead of value functions.
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Taxonomy
TopicsOptimization and Variational Analysis · Economic theories and models · Stochastic processes and financial applications
