Integrated Information Theory and Isomorphic Feed-Forward Philosophical Zombies
Jake R. Hanson, Sara I. Walker

TL;DR
This paper critically examines Integrated Information Theory by testing its assumptions against isomorphic systems, revealing that the measure of consciousness it proposes may be sensitive to arbitrary labeling, challenging its validity.
Contribution
It develops a mathematical framework to evaluate IIT's assumptions, demonstrating that is invariant under isomorphisms, which questions its ability to distinguish conscious from zombie systems.
Findings
is sensitive to label permutations in isomorphic systems.
IIT's measure can be manipulated without changing phenomenological states.
The paper argues for invariance of consciousness measures under isomorphisms.
Abstract
Any theory amenable to scientific inquiry must have testable consequences. This minimal criterion is uniquely challenging for the study of consciousness, as we do not know if it is possible to confirm via observation from the outside whether or not a physical system knows what it feels like to have an inside - a challenge referred to as the "hard problem" of consciousness. To arrive at a theory of consciousness, the hard problem has motivated the development of phenomenological approaches that adopt assumptions of what properties consciousness has based on first-hand experience and, from these, derive the physical processes that give rise to these properties. A leading theory adopting this approach is Integrated Information Theory (IIT), which assumes our subjective experience is a "unified whole", subsequently yielding a requirement for physical feedback as a necessary condition for…
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