# Third person enforcement in a prisoner's dilemma game

## TL;DR

This paper explores how third person enforcement, through potential future punishment, influences cooperation in a one-shot prisoner's dilemma game, showing that the threat of future punishment encourages cooperation.

## Contribution

It introduces a theoretical model demonstrating the impact of third person enforcement on cooperation in one-shot prisoner's dilemma games.

## Key findings

- Third person enforcement promotes cooperation in one-shot dilemmas.
- Future punishment by a third party influences players' decisions.
- Theoretical analysis shows enforcement can alter game outcomes.

## Abstract

We theoretically study the effect of a third person enforcement on a one-shot prisoner's dilemma game played by two persons, with whom the third person plays repeated prisoner's dilemma games. We find that the possibility of the third person's future punishment causes them to cooperate in the one-shot game.