# Leibniz Equivalence, Newton Equivalence, and Substantivalism

## TL;DR

This paper compares Leibniz and Newton equivalence in the context of active diffeomorphisms, exploring their implications for the substantivalism debate in philosophy of physics.

## Contribution

It introduces the concept of Newton Equivalence as a contrast to Leibniz Equivalence, offering a new perspective on the interpretation of active diffeomorphisms.

## Key findings

- Leibniz Equivalence suggests active diffeomorphisms do not change physical situations.
- Newton Equivalence posits active diffeomorphisms produce physically different but equally possible situations.
- The paper discusses implications for the substantivalism debate in philosophy of spacetime.

## Abstract

Active diffeomorphisms map a differentiable manifold to itself. They transform manifold points and objects without changing the system of local coordinates used to represent those objects. What has been called Leibniz Equivalence is the assertion that, although active diffeomorphisms do change manifold objects, they do not change what is called the "physical situation" being modeled by those objects. This paper introduces the contrasting idea of Newton Equivalence, which asserts that the different values of manifold objects produced by active diffeomorphisms do model different physical situations. But due to the assumption of general covariance, these different physical situations are all equally possible. They represent physically different situations all of which could happen. This paper compares these two interpretations of active diffeomorphisms, and comments on their importance in the substantivalism debate.