# Security measurement of a medical communication scheme based on chaos and DNA coding

## TL;DR

This paper critically analyzes a chaos and DNA coding-based medical image encryption scheme, revealing its vulnerabilities through a chosen-plaintext attack and questioning its claimed security features.

## Contribution

It introduces an efficient chosen-plaintext attack on the MPPS scheme and evaluates its security flaws, challenging prior claims of robustness.

## Key findings

- The attack discloses the scheme's equivalent secret-key with minimal plaintext-ciphertext pairs.
- The scheme's claimed resistance to certain attacks is invalidated.
- The analysis promotes better application of DNA encoding in multimedia privacy protection.

## Abstract

To encrypt sensitive information existing in a color DICOM images, a medical privacy protection scheme (called as MPPS) based on chaos and DNA coding was proposed by using two coupled chaotic systems to produce cryptographic primitives. Relying on some empirical analyses and experimental results, the designers of MPPS claimed that it can withstand a chosen-plaintext attack and some other classic attacking models. However, this statement is groundless. In this paper, we investigate the essential properties of MPPS and DNA coding, and we then propose an efficient chosen-plaintext attack to disclose its equivalent secret-key. The attack only needs $\lceil \log_{256}(3\cdot M\cdot N)\rceil+4$ pair of chosen plain-images and the corresponding cipher-images, where $M \times N$ and ``3" are the size of the RGB color image and the number of color channels, respectively. In addition, the other claimed superiorities are questioned from the perspective of modern cryptography. Both theoretical and experimental results are presented to support the efficiency of the proposed attack and the other reported security faults. The proposed cryptanalysis results will promote the proper application of DNA encoding to protect multimedia privacy data, especially that in a DICOM image.