On the security of ballot marking devices
Dan S. Wallach

TL;DR
This paper examines the security concerns of electronic ballot marking devices (BMDs), proposing auditing procedures to ensure election integrity while maintaining usability and accessibility benefits.
Contribution
It introduces auditing methods that help election officials verify BMD correctness, balancing security with usability and accessibility features.
Findings
Proposes auditing procedures for BMDs
Enhances confidence in electronic voting security
Maintains usability and accessibility benefits
Abstract
A recent debate among election experts has considered whether electronic ballot marking devices (BMDs) have adequate security against the risks of malware. A malicious BMD might produce a printed ballot that disagrees with a voter's actual intent, with the hope that voters would be unlikely to detect this subterfuge. This essay considers how an election administrator can create reasonable auditing procedures to gain confidence that their fleet of BMDs is operating correctly, allowing voters to benefit from the usability and accessibility features of BMDs while the overall election still benefits from the same security and reliability properties we expect from hand-marked paper ballots.
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Taxonomy
TopicsInternet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting · Privacy, Security, and Data Protection · Digital and Cyber Forensics
