# Frauchiger-Renner argument and quantum histories

## TL;DR

This paper reconstructs the Frauchiger-Renner argument using the Theory of Consistent Histories, demonstrating that its apparent contradiction arises from using an inconsistent family of quantum histories.

## Contribution

It applies the formalism of quantum histories to clarify the Frauchiger-Renner argument, highlighting the importance of consistency conditions in quantum probability assignments.

## Key findings

- Contradiction arises from invalid family of histories
- Consistent histories resolve the apparent paradox
- Highlights importance of consistency in quantum reasoning

## Abstract

In this article we reconstruct the Frauchiger and Renner argument, taking into account that the assertions of the argument are made at different times. To do this, we use a formalism of quantum histories, namely the Theory of Consistent Histories. We show that the supposedly contradictory conclusion of the argument requires computing probabilities in a family of histories that does not satisfy the consistency condition, i.e., an invalid family of histories for the theory.