'Two Dogmas' Redux

TL;DR

This paper revisits an information-theoretic interpretation of quantum mechanics, critiques the Everett interpretation using Wigner's Friend scenarios, and argues that the Everett interpretation is inconsistent in certain measurement contexts.

Contribution

It demonstrates that the Everett interpretation leads to modal contradictions in complex measurement scenarios, challenging its consistency.

Findings

Everett interpretation is inconsistent in 'Wigner's-Friend' scenarios.

Modal contradictions arise with 'encapsulated' measurements.

Supports an information-theoretic view over Everett's interpretation.

Abstract

About ten years ago, Itamar Pitowsky and I wrote a paper, 'Two dogmas about quantum mechanics,' in which we outlined an information-theoretic interpretation of quantum mechanics as an alternative to the Everett interpretation. Here I revisit the paper and, following Frauchiger and Renner, I show that the Everett interpretation leads to modal contradictions in 'Wigner's-Friend'-type scenarios that involve 'encapsulated' measurements, where a super-observer (which could be a quantum automaton), with unrestricted ability to measure any arbitrary observable of a complex quantum system, measures the memory of an observer system (also possibly a quantum automaton) after that system measures the spin of a qubit. In this sense, the Everett interpretation is inconsistent.