MobilBye: Attacking ADAS with Camera Spoofing

TL;DR

This paper demonstrates that Mobileye, a widely used ADAS, can be fooled by drone-projected spoofed traffic signs under various environmental conditions, highlighting a security vulnerability.

Contribution

The study introduces a novel physical attack method using drone-based projection to spoof traffic signs and tests its effectiveness against Mobileye in realistic scenarios.

Findings

Mobileye can be deceived by drone-projected traffic signs.

Environmental factors like light and shape affect attack success.

Spoofed signs are interpreted as real traffic signs by Mobileye.

Abstract

Advanced driver assistance systems (ADASs) were developed to reduce the number of car accidents by issuing driver alert or controlling the vehicle. In this paper, we tested the robustness of Mobileye, a popular external ADAS. We injected spoofed traffic signs into Mobileye to assess the influence of environmental changes (e.g., changes in color, shape, projection speed, diameter and ambient light) on the outcome of an attack. To conduct this experiment in a realistic scenario, we used a drone to carry a portable projector which projected the spoofed traffic sign on a driving car. Our experiments show that it is possible to fool Mobileye so that it interprets the drone carried spoofed traffic sign as a real traffic sign.