Report-Sensitive Spot-Checking in Peer-Grading Systems
Hedayat Zarkoob, Hu Fu, Kevin Leyton-Brown

TL;DR
This paper introduces a new peer grading incentive mechanism that reduces TA grading effort by adapting probabilities based on student reports, with proven optimality and applicability to diverse noise models.
Contribution
It presents a novel, adaptive incentive mechanism for peer grading that improves efficiency and is proven to be optimal under various assumptions.
Findings
Mechanism reduces TA grading effort compared to fixed-probability approaches.
Proven necessary and sufficient conditions for mechanism feasibility.
Demonstrated improvements through analytical and empirical analysis.
Abstract
Peer grading systems make large courses more scalable, provide students with faster and more detailed feedback, and help students to learn by thinking critically about the work of others. A key obstacle to the broader adoption of peer grading systems is motivating students to provide accurate grades. The literature has explored many different approaches to incentivizing accurate grading (which we survey in detail), but the strongest incentive guarantees have been offered by mechanisms that compare peer grades to trusted TA grades with a fixed probability. In this work, we show that less TA work is required when these probabilities are allowed to depend on the grades that students report. We prove this result in a model with two possible grades, arbitrary numbers of agents, no requirement that students grade multiple assignments, arbitrary but homogeneous noisy observation of the ground…
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Taxonomy
TopicsMachine Learning and Algorithms · Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
