Modeling Responsible Elite
Yana Tsodikova, Pavel Chebotarev, Anton Loginov, and Zoya Lezina

TL;DR
This paper uses the ViSE model to analyze how a responsible elite influences social stability, welfare, and group dynamics, showing that responsible elites can stabilize society and that competition among elites can be beneficial.
Contribution
It introduces a model of social dynamics with an elite that partially cares for society, revealing how responsible elites affect stability and welfare, and exploring elite competition effects.
Findings
Responsible elites stabilize society and prevent the 'pit of damage' paradox.
Society benefits from a responsible elite comparable to altruistic groups.
Competition among multiple elites can be advantageous for societal welfare.
Abstract
Within the ViSE (Voting in Stochastic Environment) model, we study social dynamics determined by collective decisions in a society with an elite. The model allows the analysis of the influence of participants' social attitudes, such as the effects of selfishness, collectivism, lobbying, altruism, etc., on the welfare of the society and its strata. Social dynamics is determined by the change in capital over time, as well as the formation and dissociation of groups. We show that the presence of a responsible elite, which partially cares for its own benefit, stabilizes society and removes the `pit of damage' paradox. Society's gain from having a responsible elite is comparable to that from an altruistic group of the same size. If the responsible elite succumbs to the temptation to dramatically increase the weight of the group component in its combined voting strategy, then its income rises…
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Taxonomy
TopicsEconomic theories and models · Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence · Game Theory and Applications
