Codes, communication and cognition

TL;DR

The paper critiques the neural coding concept, arguing it implies homuncular decoding, and advocates for viewing neural signals as complex, interactive causal processes rather than symbolic codes, aligning with Turing's perspective.

Contribution

It challenges the traditional neural coding metaphor, emphasizing the importance of causal interactions over symbolic decoding in understanding neural communication.

Findings

Neural coding implies homuncular decoding, which is problematic.

Complex causal throughput better explains neural communication.

The neural coding metaphor is disconnected from the symbol grounding problem.

Abstract

Brette (2019) criticizes the notion of neural coding because it seems to entail that neural signals need to be decoded by or for some receiver in the head. If that were so, then neural coding would indeed be homuncular (Brette calls it dualistic), requiring an entity to decipher the code. But I think the plea of Brett to think instead in terms of complex, interactive causal throughput is preaching to the converted. Turing (not Shannon) has already shown the way. In any case, the metaphor of neural coding has little to do with the symbol grounding problem.