# Controlling single-photon detector ID210 with bright light

## TL;DR

This paper demonstrates that the ID210 single-photon detector can be fully controlled by bright light, exposing a vulnerability that can be exploited in quantum key distribution to compromise security.

## Contribution

It provides the first experimental evidence of bright-light control of the ID210 detector and discusses potential countermeasures.

## Key findings

- ID210 detector is vulnerable to bright-light blinding
- Vulnerability can be exploited for faked-state attacks in QKD
- Countermeasures can mitigate this security risk

## Abstract

We experimentally demonstrate that a single-photon detector ID210 commercially available from ID Quantique is vulnerable to blinding and can be fully controlled by bright illumination. In quantum key distribution, this vulnerability can be exploited by an eavesdropper to perform a faked-state attack giving her full knowledge of the key without being noticed. We consider the attack on standard BB84 protocol and a subcarrier-wave scheme, and outline a possible countermeasure.