Secure Extensibility for System State Extraction via Plugin Sandboxing

TL;DR

This paper presents a secure sandboxing mechanism for third-party plugins in system data collection software, enhancing security and extensibility by isolating untrusted code within a kernel-based sandbox environment.

Contribution

It introduces a novel sandboxing approach combining kernel features to securely run untrusted plugins, protecting system data collection processes from malicious exploits.

Findings

Successfully sandboxed plugins in containerized environments

Verified containment of multiple exploits

Enhanced security without sacrificing extensibility

Abstract

We introduce a new mechanism to securely extend systems data collection software with potentially untrusted third-party code. Unlike existing tools which run extension modules or plugins directly inside the monitored endpoint (the guest), we run plugins inside a specially crafted sandbox, so as to protect the guest as well as the software core. To get the right mix of accessibility and constraints required for systems data extraction, we create our sandbox by combining multiple features exported by an unmodified kernel. We have tested its applicability by successfully sandboxing plugins of an opensourced data collection software for containerized guest systems. We have also verified its security posture in terms of successful containment of several exploits, which would have otherwise directly impacted a guest, if shipped inside third-party plugins.